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Release of investigation report M20A0434 – Chief William Saulis

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Speaking Notes - M20A0434 (Chief William Saulis)

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Introduction - Kathy Fox

Good morning everyone and thank you for joining us.

Today we are here to outline our investigation findings following the 2020 sinking of the scallop boat Chief William Saulis, leaving one deceased and five crew members still classified as missing. Our continued thoughts and condolences are with those who lost their loved ones and were impacted by this tragic accident, including members of the Annapolis Valley First Nation.

In addition to explaining what the investigation found, the Board is issuing a recommendation with regards to Transport Canada’s regulatory surveillance of safety procedure documentation available to crews to help ensure fish harvesters have access to important, potentially lifesaving information. 

To begin, I will turn things over to Pearse Flynn.

Accident summary – Pearse Flynn

Thank you, Kathy.

On December 15, 2020, shortly after midnight Atlantic Standard Time, the scallop boat Chief William Saulis with six crew members onboard, departed the fishing grounds in Chignecto Bay , New Brunswick, to return to port in Digby, Nova Scotia.

Shortly after 5:50 am, the vessel’s emergency position-indicating radio beacon activated, 12 nm off the coast of Digby. Search and rescue deployed and recovered the body of one crew member approximately ten and a half hours later. He was not wearing any lifesaving equipment.

The vessel was eventually located a month later near Delaps Cove, Nova Scotia. The five missing crew members still have not been found.

Investigation findings – Pearse Flynn

Our investigation identified several key factors that contributed to this accident.

Kathy Fox will now talk about the Board’s recommendation.

Recommendations – Kathy Fox

Thank you, Pearse.

Both the Canada Shipping Act, [2001] and the Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations are clear in their requirement that a vessel’s authorized representative – in this case, Yarmouth Sea Products, Ltd. - provide written safety procedures that familiarize vessel crews with operational and emergency activities.

Yet the Transport Canada templates do not include all procedures required by regulation. So, as seen with the Chief William Saulis, many company manuals may be incomplete if based mostly on these templates.

This is an industry-wide issue.

In 2021/2022, Transport Canada conducted a national concentrated inspection campaign on compliance with the Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations, including regulatory requirements for written safety procedures.

They found deficiencies that had not been identified through their certification program and issued deficiency notices to 62% of the 101 vessels inspected.

The largest number of deficiencies were related to vessel and crew safety, with deficiencies related to drills and drill records [41%], the completeness and accessibility of safety procedures [30%], and the crews’ knowledge of safety procedures [28%].

Companies must identify hazards specific to the nature of their operations and assess risks using a guided process, otherwise it will compromise the safety of their crew.

And if the vessel certification process doesn’t identify gaps in safety procedures and provide education, then there is a risk that authorized representatives will allow vessels to operate without effective safe work practices.

As these results demonstrate, the ongoing lack of regulatory oversight means that fishing crews are routinely operating on vessels without even knowing how to stay safe or how to respond when things go wrong.

Therefore, the Board recommends that:

Transport Canada [The Department of Transport] ensures that each inspection of a commercial fishing vessel verifies that each required written safety procedure is available to the crew and that the crew are knowledgeable of these procedures.

Conclusion – Kathy Fox

Commercial fishing is one of the most hazardous occupations in the country, with approximately 11 fish harvesters dying every year.

In 2012, the TSB released an in-depth study on the causes of fatal fishing vessel accidents. The investigation highlighted a number of systemic factors requiring attention, in particular:

It bears repeating that safety is a shared responsibility.

Yet here we are STILL talking about many of the same issues, and another six fish harvesters didn’t make it home from what could have been a preventable accident. How many more people have to be lost at sea before these changes are made?

Thank you.