Release of investigation report M22A0258 - Holiday Island

Yoan Marier, TSB Chair
Étienne Séguin-Bertrand, Senior Investigator/Safety Analyst (Marine)

Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island
23 July 2025

Check against delivery.

Yoan Marier – Introduction

Good morning and thank you for joining us.

We are here today to present the findings of our investigation into the 2022 fire and subsequent flooding aboard the passenger and vehicle ferry Holiday Island, near Wood Islands, Prince Edward Island.

Our investigation found several safety deficiencies related to emergency procedures, communication, and safety oversight, all of which fall under the responsibility of the vessel’s authorized representative, in this case, the Minister of Transport. As a result, the Board is issuing one recommendation.

It is important to note that these issues are not unique to this occurrence. They affect the safety of marine transportation across the country. This occurrence is another example of the risks related to vessel fires and the challenges of responding effectively when every second counts.

I’ll turn it over to Étienne, who will walk you through the sequence of events surrounding the Holiday Island occurrence and explain how and why they unfolded the way they did.

Étienne Séguin-Bertrand – Investigation findings

On the morning of July 22, 2022, the Holiday Island ferry departed Caribou, Nova Scotia, bound for Wood Islands with 22 crew members and 236 passengers on board.

As the vessel approached its destination, a fire broke out in the main engine room. Shortly after the fire was detected, the crew shut down the engines, attempted to close the fuel supply valves, and beached the vessel on a nearby sandbar. They deployed both anchors and activated the carbon dioxide (CO₂) fixed fire suppression system to contain the fire.

All passengers and non-essential crew members were safely evacuated, and a large-scale emergency response followed, involving multiple fire departments and other responders. Despite their efforts, the fire could not be extinguished, and the vessel was ultimately abandoned.

As the fire continued to burn into the following afternoon, the engine room filled with seawater, causing the vessel to list noticeably to one side. At their peak, water levels in the engine room rose above the height of the engines, likely playing a key role in extinguishing the remaining flames.

Two days later, on the morning of July 24, the Holiday Island was towed to the Wood Islands terminal where it was later declared a total constructive loss.

The investigation found that over the course of a month, while the vessel remained in service, a series of temporary repairs were made to the engine fuel injection system using non-standard materials and methods.

On the day of the occurrence, a temporary repair installed the day before failed, which resulted in fuel spraying onto hot engine components, igniting the fire.

In the process of fighting the fire, the crew believed they had activated the CO₂ fire suppression system from the bridge. However, the instructions were unclear, and the system was not actually engaged.

Initially, this went unnoticed, allowing the fire to grow. It wasn’t until 15 minutes later that the crew manually released the CO₂. By then, the fire had intensified.

Additionally, the engine room had not been fully sealed. As a result, when the CO₂ was finally released, it likely dispersed and allowed oxygen to continue entering the space. This reduced the suppression system’s effectiveness, and the fire continued to burn. However, efforts from the crew and first responders prevented the fire from spreading outside the engine room.

Nearly one year ago, following our investigation into another 2022 ferry occurrence, the Board issued three recommendations related to crew training, passenger evacuation procedures, and the need for accurate passenger counts.

Many of these same issues were identified once again with the Holiday Island.

For instance, there were significant discrepancies in the reported number of passengers. In this occurrence, the master initially reported 182 passengers on board; however, once everyone was accounted for on shore, the actual number was 236, a difference of 54 people.

This is one example, but the message is clear: the same safety deficiencies are surfacing again and again.

I will now turn things back over to Yoan, who will speak about the Board’s recommendation.

Yoan Marier – Recommendation

This was a complex occurrence involving several challenging factors: both fire and flooding occurred in the engine room, and a large number of first responders were involved. Additionally, the crew had varying levels of training and familiarity with the life-saving equipment needed to evacuate passengers.

This occurrence highlights two significant ongoing challenges which have been identified in previous investigations: first, the lack of awareness or understanding of the various requirements and responsibilities imposed on the vessel’s authorized representative, and second, the management of marine emergencies on large vessels.

Regarding the first challenge, the investigation found that there was uncertainty surrounding the role of the authorized representative. Under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, the authorized representative is legally responsible for ensuring that the vessel complies with all current safety and regulatory requirements. In this case, the Government of Canada’s Minister of Transport was identified as the registered owner and authorized representative of the Holiday Island.

Transport Canada had a charter agreement with Northumberland Ferries Limited, or NFL, to operate the vessel. Although NFL was expected to act as if it were the authorized representative, the legal responsibility for those duties remained with Transport Canada.

In this case, the investigation found that many staff members at Transport Canada and NFL were unsure of the role’s requirements or who was responsible for carrying out the responsibilities.

The lack of clarity extended into critical areas such as operations, emergency repairs, and oversight. Communications between the operator and Transport Canada were informal, and oversight of vessel maintenance and operations was limited.

This is not the first time the TSB has identified issues related to the roles and responsibilities of the authorized representative. Previous investigations have identified recurring gaps in how these duties are understood and carried out.

Specific duties are defined in more than 30 regulations made under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001. Understanding and keeping up with such a broad scope of responsibility can be a challenging task.

Transport Canada, as the regulator, expects authorized representatives to take proactive measures to learn which regulations apply to their vessel and how to follow them. However, as this investigation and many others demonstrate, the role is not clearly understood across many parts of the industry. If authorized representatives do not have a clear understanding of the scope of their responsibilities with respect to safety, vessels may operate without the minimum defences provided by meeting regulatory requirements, and critical safety obligations can be inadequately addressed, or worse, overlooked.

Therefore, the Board recommends that

Yoan Marier – Launch of Safety Issue Investigation

The findings in this investigation go beyond this single occurrence, shedding further light on broader, systemic risks related to vessel fires and the challenges of responding effectively.

On commercial vessels, crew are trained and equipped to handle a wide range of emergencies using the resources available on board. But even the most experienced crew can quickly find themselves in a situation that escalates beyond their capacity and requires external support.

Vessel fires remain one of the most serious types of emergency at sea. In its 35 years, the TSB has issued 9 safety concerns and 10 recommendations related to fire safety.And, in the last ten years, nearly 400 fires on commercial vessels were reported to the TSB.

So, the underlying question remains: why do fires continue to overwhelm crews?

The success of any firefighting effort depends on several critical factors: the equipment at hand, the training and experience of those responding, and the location and accessibility of the fire itself.

In the case of the Holiday Island, the outcome could have been a lot worse. The emergency response that followed was successful due to incidental, but fortunate, circumstances. The fire broke out when the vessel was near the terminal, it was daylight, the weather was manageable, the seas were calm, a modern evacuation system was installed earlier that year, and help was nearby. We’ve said it before and we’re saying it again: do not mistake luck for emergency preparedness.

In 2024, the Board issued two separate safety concerns. The first related to insufficient crew knowledge on the proper use of carbon dioxide fixed fire suppression systems and the second touched the gaps in Canada’s preparedness for marine emergencies. Both these concerns are highlighted in this report and illustrate the need for more urgent and effective action to reduce the associated risks.

That is why, today in addition to our recommendation to Transport Canada, the TSB is launching a nationwide safety issue investigation focused specifically on vessel fires and emergency response in Canada.

We will be working with marine operators, firefighting services, ports and harbours, and other key industry partners to build a clearer picture of how vessel fires are currently managed—to identify areas of improvement in Canada’s preparedness for marine emergencies.

Yoan Marier - Conclusion

So today, we are not just concluding an investigation—we are opening the door to a national conversation on vessel fire safety and encouraging all stakeholders to actively participate in that discussion.

Our goal is clear: to ensure that every person who steps aboard any vessel in Canada can do so with confidence that systems are in place to protect them.

The Holiday Island—and others before it—are canaries in a coal mine. They serve as warnings of deeper, systemic issues within our marine safety framework. They reveal cracks that, if left unaddressed, could widen into far more serious consequences.

Thank you.