Marine transportation safety investigation M24C0142

The TSB has completed this investigation. The report was published on 21 May 2026.

Table of contents

    Collision
    Passenger vessel Navark Faucon Millenium and pleasure craft
    St. Lawrence River
    Longueuil, Quebec

    The occurrence

    During the afternoon of 27 June 2024, the passenger vessel Navark Faucon Millenium departed BouchervilleAll locations are in the province of Quebec unless otherwise indicated. for a 30-minute passage to the Old Port of Montréal. There were 38 passengers on board, and the crew consisted of 1 master and 1 deckhand. 

    Immediately after departure, the deckhand gave a safety briefing to all of the passengers in the deckhouse. The vessel proceeded along its route in the Chenal du Sud at a speed of approximately 20 knots, on an average heading of 245° true (T). 

    As the Navark Faucon Millenium was passing l’Îlot de la Baronnie, the master saw a pleasure craft at approximately 10° off the port bow, at a distance of 0.7 nautical miles (NM) and determined that a close port-to-port passing would occur. The master maintained the vessel’s speed and applied starboard helm, altering the vessel’s course by less than 5°. 

    Earlier that afternoon, pleasure craft 59E53608 had left Quai Marina in Repentigny with 6 occupants on board. The pleasure craft toured the Old Port of Montréal and started travelling back to Repentigny. On the return trip, the operator of the pleasure craft changed course toward Boucherville in the Chenal du Sud. The operator estimated the pleasure craft’s speed at 20 statute miles per hour (17.4 knots) with a heading of 060°T. However, the direction and strength of the wind and current, both of which were pushing the vessel from the stern, gave the impression of a lower speed; the pleasure craft was actually travelling at an average speed of 32 knots. The operator of the pleasure craft saw the Navark Faucon Millenium less than 1 minute before the collision and visually estimated that the pleasure craft and the Navark Faucon Millenium would pass each other port to port at a distance of approximately 7 m. He maintained an average heading of 060°T and a speed of 32 knots. Five seconds before the collision, when the vessels were approximately 0.06 NM (110 m) apart, the pleasure craft’s heading suddenly changed by 4° to port, directly into the path of the Navark Faucon Millenium. The pleasure craft struck the port bow of the Navark Faucon Millenium. Several passengers on the Navark Faucon Millenium were thrown onto the deck by the impact of the collision. The deckhand provided first aid to some of the injured passengers who were on the forward deck, while others were treated by uninjured fellow passengers. 

    The master reported the collision to Marine Communications and Traffic Services Québec and informed Croisières Navark Inc. of the occurrence. The Navark Faucon Millenium then went back to Longueuil, where the passengers disembarked. Some passengers were transferred to a local hospital for further treatment. After the vessel returned to Boucherville, it was temporarily removed from service for repairs.

    The operator of the pleasure craft called 911 on his cellphone to report the collision. The pleasure craft was escorted to Pointe-aux-Trembles by CCGS Sipu Muin, which was nearby. After the occupants of the pleasure craft disembarked, 5 of them travelled by private vehicle to a local hospital for treatment.

    The TSB investigation into this occurrence found that the Navark Faucon Millenium and the pleasure craft approached each other on nearly reciprocal courses with a combined speed of 52 knots, and neither operator significantly altered course or reduced speed. Consequently, there was little margin of safety in the passing situation. The pleasure craft veered suddenly toward the Navark Faucon Millenium 4 seconds before the anticipated passing, likely due to dynamic instability while planing at high speed. This, combined with the close passing distance, left insufficient time for either operator to respond to the unexpected change of course. Relying on his previous experience, the master of the Navark Faucon Millenium expected that the pleasure craft operator to take action to ensure a safe passing. This expectation resulted in him maintaining speed and only slightly altering course despite recognizing a risk of a collision. The pleasure craft operator’s assessment of the passing was based on his previous experience and did not account for the effects of dynamic instability. As a result, he maintained his course and speed without realizing that there was little margin of safety to account for unexpected events that might cause his course to change.

    When passengers on board the Navark Faucon Millenium were thrown to the deck as a result of the collision, many of their injuries were exacerbated by physical hazards on board that had not been identified previously.

    The TSB also identified other risks: 

    • Pleasure craft occupants who do not a wear a properly fitted personal flotation device or lifejacket while they are on an open deck are at risk of drowning if they go overboard from the vessel.
    • If the crew complement specified on a vessel’s safe manning document is insufficient to respond to an emergency, there is a risk that the emergency response will not ensure the safety of the vessel’s crew and passengers.
    • If on-board emergency procedures are incomplete and the practised drills do not reflect realistic emergencies, an actual emergency response may increase the risk to the vessel, crew, passengers, and others involved in the emergency.

    Following this occurrence, the TSB issued a safety letter to Croisières Navark Inc. on 29 August 2024 regarding the physical safety of the Navark Faucon Millenium.

    Transport Canada conducted an inspection of the hull, during which damage was found. A periodic inspection validated the temporary repairs to the hull, and a new deadline was set for permanent repairs to be made. 

    Following the TSB’s safety letter, Croisières Navark Inc. secured the bicycle rack to the deck of the Navark Faucon Millenium and updated the verbal pre-departure passenger safety briefing and the safety messages that play continuously on the television monitors on board each shuttle. During the 2025 season, Croisières Navark Inc. tested protective strips on exposed sharp edges to determine the best course of action for applying them to the company’s fleet. Handrails were added to the Navark Faucon Millenium during the 2024–2025 off-season.

    Pleasure Craft Operator Competency Program 

    The TSB investigation into this occurrence revealed safety deficiencies related to the ability of pleasure craft operators to identify and manage risks in complex marine environments, such as waterways shared with other traffic. 

    In 2022, the TSB carried out a survey of Canadian licensed marine pilots in support of an investigation between a large commercial vessel and a pleasure craft. The results of the survey indicated that better education and training for pleasure craft operators was the most important factor to help reduce close-quarters situations and the risk of collision with commercial vessels. 

    Following a collision between the passenger ferry Svanoy and a pleasure craft in 2023, the Board issued the following safety concern about the adequacy of the PCOC program: 

    [T]he Board is concerned that the current requirements for training and certificating pleasure craft operators do not provide them with the depth of knowledge necessary for safe navigation on high-traffic waterways.

    To learn a complex skill such as vessel navigation, a structured approach to training is needed. There are different ways to achieve the desired goal, but there are some recognized approaches that have become widespread as a result of their success, such as graduated licensing and periodic refresher training. 

    For this reason, the Board recommends that

    the Department of Transport modify the Pleasure Craft Operator Competency Program to ensure that pleasure craft operators acquire and maintain a sufficient level of knowledge to be able to respond to the unique elements of the conditions in which they operate.

    TSB Recommendation M26-01

    View the M24C0142 placemat here.


    Safety communications

    Safety advisory letter


    Investigation information

    Map showing the location of the occurrence

    M24C0142

    Collision
    Passenger vessel Navark Faucon Millenium and pleasure craft
    St. Lawrence River
    Longueuil, Quebec

    Photos


      Download high-resolution photos from the TSB Flickr page.

    Class of investigation

    This is a class 3 investigation. These investigations analyze a small number of safety issues, and may result in recommendations. Class 3 investigations are generally completed within 450 days. For more information, see the Policy on Occurrence Classification.

    TSB investigation process

    There are 3 phases to a TSB investigation

    1. Field phase: a team of investigators examines the occurrence site and wreckage, interviews witnesses and collects pertinent information.
    2. Examination and analysis phase: the TSB reviews pertinent records, tests components of the wreckage in the lab, determines the sequence of events and identifies safety deficiencies. When safety deficiencies are suspected or confirmed, the TSB advises the appropriate authority without waiting until publication of the final report.
    3. Report phase: a confidential draft report is approved by the Board and sent to persons and corporations who are directly concerned by the report. They then have the opportunity to dispute or correct information they believe to be incorrect. The Board considers all representations before approving the final report, which is subsequently released to the public.

    For more information, see our Investigation process page.

    The TSB is an independent agency that investigates air, marine, pipeline, and rail transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.